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“Thank you Chairman Stupak. Today we hold our third and very critical hearing in this Subcommittee’s ongoing investigation of the tragic Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill, which continues to wreak economic and environmental havoc on our Gulf Coast.

“This hearing provides the Subcommittee an important opportunity to question directly the man who ultimately leads BP, Mr. Tony Hayward, the company’s Chief Executive Officer. And BP’s role has been central to the causes of the incident and the response.

“Over the course of our inquiry to date, Committee investigators working in a bi-partisan fashion have conducted numerous interviews and briefings, and reviewed tens of thousands of pages of documents. I am especially proud that this subcommittee has been focused on gathering the facts and not rushing to judgments or looking for cheap political sound-bites. And from this intensive effort, we have begun to identify a number of serious questions about BP’s decision-making leading up to the disaster. Exploring these and related questions today will help us identify for Congress and the American people what went wrong on April 20 and the days thereafter.

“While we are still investigating, a picture of the chain of events leading to this incident is emerging. Mr. Chairman, you and Chairman Waxman recently outlined some critical questions to be addressed by Mr. Hayward. For example, you noted the investigation has identified questionable choices by BP engineers to use a particular well design over another one that would appear to have provided more built-in barriers to gas flowing uncontrolled up the well.

“There was the choice made by BP to move forward with what appears to be an inadequate cementing plan and the related failure, despite clear warnings, to test that the cement was properly set and in place. And it appears there may have been a rush to move off of this well. Whether there may have been economic or other time- or performance-pressures, or some combination, it is not quite clear.

“The questions arising from our investigation outline the central role BP’s decision-making appears to have had in this incident. We need to understand this decision-making, what factors influenced it, and whether decisions reflected a management and operational mindset that failed to maximize safety in the challenging deep sea environment.

“It is important to note the picture developing from this investigation is not one of technological limits in deep sea drilling; the construction of this 18,000 foot well was not pushing the envelope of engineering know-how so far as we have identified.
“The picture developing is not one of unsafe industry practices, although clearer, more focused industry standards may be in order going forward. Available evidence suggests use of best industry practices would have resulted in more cautious designs and testing, more safeguards to minimize any loss of control.

“Rather, and quite clearly, the picture developing from our investigation is one of questionable decision-making – decision-making by people charged with designing and successfully drilling, constructing, and controlling a well that was a mile underwater. It is a picture composed of a series of choices, which, taken together, created an oil well particularly vulnerable to a blowout, and of people who may have been distracted, unaware, or resistant to the problems developing below them.

“Documents show that BP was prepared to run a test on the quality of the cement job securing the well, but chose not to when unrelated drilling measurements looked okay. I cannot understand why, given the history of this particular well, with four previous well-control incidents in the two months prior to April 20, the rig personnel appeared to take their eye off the ball.

“BP employees were key decision-makers. Certainly others – contractors, subcontractors, and federal regulators – may have contributed to the incident. The role of the federal government especially, including in the overall effectiveness of the response and efforts to help those harmed by this incident, remains a critical piece that we must pursue to ensure a competent investigation.

“But it is BP decision-making about the well design, the cementing program and preparation, the integrity tests – or lack thereof – the failure to follow certain best practices, that our investigation to date is showing were critical factors in this incident.

“But this decision-making is difficult to square with the avowed priorities of BP’s Chief Executive. Mr. Hayward, in an interview before you became chief executive, you described how the death of a worker on an operation you were leading in Venezuela shaped your opinions. You said; “I went to the funeral to pay my respects. At the end of the service, his mother came up and beat me on the chest. ‘Why did you let it happen?’ she asked. It changed the way I think about safety. Leaders must make the safety of all who work for them their top priority.”
“Mr. Hayward, I respectfully request you answer this question in your opening statement, if not for me, then for the widows of the 11 men lost on Deepwater Horizon:
“You have been the BP chief executive since 2007. You said safety is your number one priority and would focus on it like a laser beam. As an effective Chief Executive, one would expect your directives and priorities would be carried out by your employees. We have now learned from this investigation that BP employees made five critical decisions that may have contributed to well failure where safety was traded off – it was not the priority.
“Will you insist before this Subcommittee today that all decisions by BP employees related to Deepwater Horizon reflected your priority of safety-first?

“Mr. Chairman, the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico shows the consequences of a series of unchecked, bad decisions. We in Congress and the federal government must also be mindful of the consequences of bad decision-making. At a field hearing last week in Chalmette, Louisiana, the Subcommittee learned that some of the Administration’s decisions are threatening the livelihoods of workers and families who depend on the energy industry. Our hearing today looks at the consequences of bad decisions and the lessons learned; may we have the wisdom and humility to take some of those lessons and apply them to ourselves.”