Statement of Congressman Michael C. Burgess, M.D.

House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee

Hearing on 9/11 Commission Recommendations for Transportation Security

August 25, 2004

Good morning. I would like to thank Commissioner Lehman, Administrator Stone, and the other witnesses for participating in the hearing this morning. I believe the 9/11 Commission has produced a historic document about the events leading up to the attacks of September 11th. Their recommendations warrant our full attention and scrutiny.

The Commission’s report states that targeting terrorists’ ability to travel is a potent weapon in our efforts to protect America against a future terrorist attack.

The terrorist attacks of September 11^th and the innocent lives that were lost represent one of the greatest tragedies in American history. In the wake of that devastating attack, it became clear that our government was not prepared for this type of threat and that swift action is imperative in order to defend our nation.

The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission are wide-ranging. Although the recommendations for transportation security are a small part of the overall report, their importance cannot be understated.

Our transportation system is vast and the challenge of securing it difficult, but we can develop a security system for it if we are willing to invest the resources into it. We can make our transportation system more secure and less vulnerable to attack.

The 9-11 Commission report addresses many of the problems facing the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) that the Committee has identified in numerous oversight hearings over the last two years. The report also makes a number of critical policy recommendations – better planning and more effective screening procedures. The report makes it very clear that TSA must improve the passenger screening process through the use of biometric technologies. We need to secure our skys by implementing more effective security screening procedures like biometric technologies, but we also must not be afraid to implement no-fly lists and CAPPS II. Additionally, the report urges the TSA to expedite the installation of advanced (in-line) baggage screening equipment.

My hometown airport – the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport - was one of the first airports to install Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) in-line baggage screening systems to improve the passenger screening process. Section 605 of the Vision 100 – The Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act requires the TSA to reimburse large hub airports for 90 percent of the costs of installing EDS, and to revise previously signed Letters of Intent (LOI) to provide for reimbursement at the 90 level. As of today, eight airports have Letters of Intent with the TSA for EDS installation, including DFW Airport.

DFW Airport signed its Letter of Intent in 2003. DFW Airport is working with the TSA and Congress to ensure that they provide the most efficient and effective passenger baggage screening system for the traveling public. However, we need to ensure that all participants in an integrated transportation security system are involved in the decisionmaking process to ensure swift implementation.

In almost three years since September 11^th, we have all struggled with developing an integrated transportation security network. We have been very patient with TSA as they have had an enormous start-up task, but the grace period is over. Although we have made progress in strengthening our commercial aviation security system, we are still far from having the security regime in place that we need for this vital and highest profile segment of our transportation network. More disturbingly, other aspects of the aviation system – notably air cargo and general aviation -remain far too vulnerable. Improving security is a dynamic process and DHS and TSA appear to be stalled in developing a coordinated and integrated approach to transportation security.

Although TSA witnesses have told this Committee that they are developing the layered security approach advocated by the 9/11 Commission and others, I am not sure that all of the layers are working in conjunction with one another. As the Commission notes in its report, the bulk of our efforts to improve transportation security have focused on aviation security, which I think is appropriate, but we must do more to make sure our ports, railroads, and transit systems are integrated into a comprehensive security network. For example, the Port of Houston, Texas, which handles millions of tons of oil, hazardous chemicals, and bulk cargo, is connected to a rail and highway infrastructure. The security of the Port cannot be adequately considered without the security of the rails and highways that connect to it.

I believe that air cargo and general aviation represent potential new avenues for terrorists to exploit. As we build security layers around commercial aviation, our enemies will seek other ways to access our air transportation network. Terrorists will always seek out the weakest link and I believe that air cargo and general aviation remain weak links in aviation security efforts.

The threat of terrorism and as a consequence the requirements for security at general aviation airports will vary from one airport to the next. Location, size, type of aircraft operating into the airport, and costs of providing security are all factors that need to be weighed when considering security mandates. There is no mold that fits all. For example, Alliance Airport in Fort Worth, Texas, is a general aviation reliever airport. It primarily serves the needs of industry and business and readily handles cargo aircraft, business aircraft, general aviation and some military. To date, the airport has never had a breach of security.

Many general aviation airports are already operating at a loss and the imposition of mandatory security requirements will force them to shut down. We need to be careful to not quickly impose confusing, mandatory regulations that in the long run will impede aviation without increasing security.

The 9/11 Commission, however, confirms my view that general aviation and air cargo remain significant gaps in our aviation security network. We must make sure that all sectors of our aviation system are secure.

I am deeply disappointed that TSA still has not developed a comprehensive integrated transportation security plan for general aviation. I am also concerned that TSA seems to be relying too heavily on general aviation operators and the air cargo industry to develop their own security protocols. And, much of the security regimes put in place for these sectors are voluntary. I understand that both general aviation and air cargo are vast and complex segments of the aviation industry and I know they are working hard to make sure they are secure. However, we need to work with TSA to ensure the best security procedures are in place to meet the needs of general aviation and air cargo security without adversely affecting this industry.

Furthermore, TSA directives are often unrealistic demands that cause confusion and additional work to be completed in a very short period of time. This in turn impedes security personnel training and information sharing between TSA, the airports, and the airlines. The need to work together to create a viable, integrated security plan that allows the airlines to function together with security demands is necessary to sustain the economic viability of the commercial airline sector. Ad hoc regulations and directives from the TSA undermine this vital cooperation.

TSA needs to continue to eliminate human error by introducing more technology to streamline an integrated transportation security network. New technology is costly, but saves money in the long run and makes everyone – airline personnel and passengers – more secure as soon as it is put in place. We must make our passenger and baggage screening more effective and efficient, but it will take an investment in technology and people to develop a truly effective transportation security strategy.

More importantly, to make any strategy work we must develop the proper framework to make this happen, and as the Commission's report indicates – planning is necessary in order to ensure that needed changes occur. TSA must change its current operating procedures if it is to implement the 9-11 Commission’s recommendations. At present, I am concerned that TSA and DHS are not developing an integrated transportation approach that will be responsive, flexible, and forward thinking, but rather are creating a stove-piped modal approach to security. Our modes of transportation are linked and our transportation security efforts should be multi-modal.

We cannot let the weight of bureaucracy slow the implementation of nearly any program or project to a crawl. We especially cannot let this happen when dealing with our homeland defense. Congress has directed DHS and TSA to develop plans that will allow us to look forward rather than simply plugging holes that exist in our on-going efforts as we become aware of them. We need action plans put in place immediately to implement the security system developed in response to the tragedy of 9-11 – it is what is necessary to ensure that the citizens of the U.S. are appropriately served by our government.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing and I look forward to listening to the witness’ testimony.